Time, Chance, and Action by Haddawy, Peter
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
147 
Time, Chance, and Action 
Peter Haddawy • 
Department of Computer Science, University of lllinois 
405 North Mathews Avenue, Urbana, lllinois 61801 
email: haddawy@cs. uiuc.edu 
Abstract 
To operate intelligently in the world, an agent 
must reason about the consequences of its ac­
tions. The consequences of an action are a func­
tion of both the state of the world and of the 
action itself. In realistic domains we cannot ex­
pect to have complete information, so a repre­
sentation for reasoning about actions must be 
able to express uncertainty concerning the state 
of the world and the effects of actions and other 
events. This paper presents a future-branching 
temporal probability logic for reasoning about 
actions. The logic can represent the probabil­
ity that facts hold and events occur at various 
times. It can represent the probability that 
actions and other events affect the future. It 
can represent concurrent actions and conditions 
that hold or change during execution of an ac­
tion. The model of probability relates proba­
bilities over time. The logical language inte­
grates both modal and probabilistic constructs 
and can thus represent and distinguish between 
possibility, probability, and truth. Several ex­
amples illustrating the use of the logic are given. 
1 Introduction 
To choose intelligent courses of action, an agent must 
reason about the state of the world and the way in 
which actions affect the world. In realistic domains 
we cannot expect to have complete information, so a 
representation for reasoning about actions must be 
able to express uncertainty concerning the state of 
the world and the effects of actions and other events. 
For example, the statement "H I were to smoke, I 
would contract lung cancer some years down the 
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road" can at best be said to hold with high like­
lihood. There are uncertain environmental factors 
that can influence my chance of contracting cancer 
as well as uncertainty in the effects of smoking. 
In order to reason about the effects of actions, it 
is necessary to be able to reason about time. Facts 
tend to be true for periods of time and events oc­
cur at particular times. Actions comprising a plan 
may occur sequentially or concurrently. Actions and 
other events affect the future, but not the past. 
Chance evolves with time: the chance of rain tomor­
row may not be the same now as it will be tonight. 
Ambiguities in the world are resolved with time: be­
fore a fair coin is :flipped the chance of heads is 50% 
but after it is flipped it either certainly landed heads 
or it certainly did not. 
We present a propositional temporal probability 
logic that can represent all of these aspects of time 
and chance. The logical language integrates both 
modal and probabilistic constructs and can thus rep­
resent and distinguish between possibility, probabil­
ity, and truth. For example, the language allows us 
to write sentences that 
1) describe concurrent actions: 
• It is not possible for me to raise and lower my arm 
at the same time. 
2) describe conditions during an action that influ­
ence the probabilistic effects of the action: 
• H the oven temperature is constant while I am 
baking the souffle, the souflle is likely to turn out 
right. 
3) mix statements about probability and inevitabil­
ity: 
• There is a 50% chance that at noon the train crash 
will be inevitable. 
4) distinguish between truth and probability: 
• I won the lottery even though it was unlikely. 
Numerous researchers have developed temporal 
logics for reasoning about plans and actions [Mc­
Dermott, 1982; Allen, 1984; Haas, 1985; Pelavin and 
.Allen, 1986; Shoham, 1987]. Others have developed 
logics of probability [Fagin and Halpern, 1988; Bac­
chus, 1988]. But no work has addressed all theses 
issues in a comprehensive logical framework. Such a 
framework is necessary for representing and reason­
ing about plans in uncertain domains. 
The theory literature contains several examples of 
logics that can represent both time and probability 
[Lehmann and Shelah, 1982; Hart and Shair, 1984; 
Halpern and Tuttle, 1989). The focus of these log­
ics is on reasoning about probabilistic programs and 
distributed systems. The logics do not attempt to 
model aspects of causality or to distinguish between 
c:lliferent types of temporal objects such as facts and 
events; hence, they are not suitable for reasoning 
about actions and plans. 
The logic presented here extends the capabilities 
of current planning logics by providing a probabilis­
tic treatment of causality, concurrent actions, and 
conditions that hold or change during execution of 
an action. The logic combines aspects of Pelavin's 
[1988] temporal planning logic, van Fraa.ssen's [1980] 
models of objective chance, and Fagin, Halpern, and 
Megiddo's [1988] probability logic. This paper does 
not address some of the traditional planning issues 
such as qualification and persistence. These issues 
are beyond the scope of the present work. What the 
developed logic does is provide a framework within 
which to explore such issues for domains in which un­
certainty is a factor. Furthermore, this paper does 
not discuss complete axiomatizations of the logic. 
The logic presented is intended to be used as a tool 
in the representation of planning problems and the 
design and analysis of planning algorithms. The au­
thor does not believe that axioma.tizing the logic and 
feeding the axioms to a theorem prover is a reason­
able way to solve planning problems. Rather, we 
should strive to design special purpose planning al­
gorithms that are faithful to the semantics of the 
logic. This logic presented will enable us to do this 
for a new class of interesting and difficult planning 
problems and to prove the correctness of these algo­
rithms. 
2 The Ontology 
Time is modeled as a collection of world-histories, 
each representing one possible chronology or his­
tory of events throughout time. At any given point 
in time, some of the world-histories will naturally 
share a common past up to that time. Thus the 
world-histories can be formed into a tree structure 
that btanches into the future. Note that the:re is 
no special status given to the time "now", so the 
tempotal tree bta.nches into the future relative to 
each point in time. The present work is only con­
cetned with future-btanching time because actions 
and other events can only affect the state of the 
world at times after their occurrence. Relative to 
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any point in time, the past is determined; only the 
futute contains open possibilities. We talk about 
specific times by reference to a global time line, a 
linearly-ordered set of points. The time line is nec­
essary in order to compare facts and events at the 
same time in c:lliferent branches of the time tree. 
In the wo:rld, facts tend to hold and events tend 
to occur over intervals of time. Each fact is associ­
ated with the set of temporal intervals over which it 
holds. If a fact holds over an interval then it holds 
over all subintervals of that interval. So, for example, 
if my car is red over a period of time, then it is red 
throughout that time. Events are somewhat more 
complex than facts. F irst, one must distinguish be­
tween event type& and event tokeru. An event type 
is a general class of events and an event token is 
a specific instance of an event type. Fot example, 
picking up a book is an event type, and picking up 
the blue book on my desk at 9:00am is an event to­
ken of that type. The interval over which an event 
token occurs is the smallest interval over which it 
occurs from beginning to end. If I pick up a book 
during a time period, there is no smaller period of 
time during which the event of my picking up the 
book can be said to have occuned. On the other 
hand, numerous tokens of a given event type may 
occur during a particular inte:rval. For example, I 
can pick up one book with my right hand and one 
with my left hand concuuently. So if a token of an 
event type occurs over an interval, it is possible for 
another token of that type to occur over a subin­
terval, but it is not necessary as it is in the case of 
facts. This paper will deal with event types and for 
brevity will simply :refer to them as events. 
The fact/event dichotomy just described is a sim­
plification of the true situation. As Shoham [1987] 
has shown, there are many c:lliferent types of facts 
and events, characterized by their temporal proper­
ties. Although Shoham's refined categories of fact 
types constitute a more useful and accurate picture 
of the world than the simple fact/event dichotomy, 
the fact/event categorization will be used for sim­
plicity of exposition. Extending the work to encom­
pass Shoham's categories is completely straightfor­
ward. 
Uncertainty is represented by defining probabili­
ties over the tree of possible futures. Because the 
present work is concerned with representing proba­
bilistic effects, one talks about probability at a given 
point in time and probability is :represented in such 
a way that the probability of the past, relative to 
that point, is either zero or one. In this way, actions 
and other events can only affect the probabilities of 
future facts and events. This type of probability is 
objective, as opposed to subjective probability, with 
regard to which the past can be uncertain. For ex­
ample, subjectively I may be uncertain as to whether 
the train left on time or not, yet objectively it either 
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certainly left or it certainly did not, and further­
more, there is nothing I can do now to change that. 
The other property imposed on objective probability 
is that the probability be completely determined by 
the history up to the current time. So probability is 
purely a function of the state of the world. This is in 
contrast to subjective probability where probability 
is a function not only of the state of the world but 
also of the epistemic state of an agent. 
3 Syntax 
To refer to facts and events occurring in time the 
language contains two predicates. HOLDS asso­
ciates a fact with the interval of time over which it is 
true and OCC associates an event with the interval 
over which it occurs. The language contains three 
modal operators to talk about inevitability, possi­
bility, and chance. The D operator designates in­
evitability and we write Dt(cf>) to indicate that cf> is 
necessarily true at time t. Possibility 0 is defined 
in terms of inevitability as Ot(cf>) = •Dt(•cf>). We 
write Ot(cf>) to say that cf> is possibly true at tinle 
t. The chance operator P designates the probability 
of a sentence at a given time. We write Pt(cf>) � a 
to say that the probability of cf> at time t is at least 
a. The sentence form Pt(cf>) :$ o: is used as a short­
hand for Pt(•cf>) � 1- a, and similarly =, >, and 
< are used. Following the syntax of Fagin, Halpern, 
and Megiddo's [1988] probability logic of polynomial 
weight formulas, polynomial combinations of proba­
bility operators will be allowed. Thus the language 
can express things like "c/> is at least twice as likely 
as 1/J": Pt(cf>) � 2Pt('I/J). This is particularly useful 
for writing sentences about conditional probability. 
The probability of cf> given 1/J is defined as 
prob(c/>11/1) = prob(cf> A 1/1)/prob(,P). 
If the probability of the conditioning sentence 1/J is 
zero, then the conditional probability is undefined. 
In this case, a conditional probability sentence like 
prob(c/>11/J) = a can be assigned neither the value 
true nor the value false. Rather than introducing 
a new conditional probability operator and dealing 
with this truth assignment problem, sentences about 
conditional probability can simply be written in the 
form 
Pt(cf>A,P) � aPt('ifJ). 
Note that the standard conditional probability nota­
tion will be used to syntactically denote a sentence 
of the above form: 
Pt(cf>I'I/J) �a. 
The lexicon of the language consists of the follow­
ing three sets of nonlogical symbob: TC, a set of 
time point symbols; FACTS, a set of fact symbols; 
EVENTS, a set of event symbols. 
The set of of well-formed formulas combining the 
logical and nonlogical symbols is recursively defined 
as follows: 
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1. If t1, t2 E TC then t1 = t2, t1 j t2, and t1 -< t2 
are wffs. 
2. If t1, t2 E TC and fa E FACTS then 
HOLDS(t1, t2, fa) is a wff. 
3. If t1, t2 E TC and ev E EVENTS then 
OCC(t1, t2, ev) is a wff. 
4. If c/>1 and c/>2 are wffs then so are c/>1 A c/>2, c/>1 V c/>2, 
and •c/>1· 
5. If cf> is a wff and t ETC then Dt(cf>) is a wff. 
6. If c/>1, ••• , cf>,. are wffs, Oo, ••• , O�c are real numbers, 
and t ETC then OoPt(cf>l) • ••• • Pt(cf>�c) + 01Pt(cf>t) • 
••• • Pt(cf>�c-1) + ... + O�c � 0 is a wff. 
The four example sentences from the introduction 
can be represented as follows. In the first three sen­
tence below to, t1, t2, ta are time points such that 
(to -< t1 -< t2 -< ts) and to denotes the time "now". 
• It is not possible for me to raise and lower my arm 
at the same time. 
•Oto[OCC(raise, it. t2) A OCC(Iower, t1. t2)] 
• If the oven temperature is constant while I am 
baking the souffle, the souffle is likely to turn out 
right. 
Pt0(HOLDS(souffle-done-right, t2, t2)l 
OCC(bake-souffle, t11 t2) A 
HOLDS(oven-temp-const, t1, t2)) � .9 
• There is a 50% chance that at noon the train crash 
will be inevitable. 
(t1 =noon) A Pt0( Dt1DCC(t2, ta, crash))= .5 
In the next sentence t0, t1, and t2 are all time points 
in the past and (to -< t1 -< t2). 
• I won the lottery even though it was unlikely. 
Pt0(0CC(tl, t2, win-lottery))= .0001 A 
OCC(t11 t2, win-lottery) 
4 Semantics 
A model is a 7-tuple (W, T, FA, EV, R, P R, F), 
where: 
• W is the set of possible world-histories. 
• T is a totally ordered set of time points, corre­
sponding to the reals. 
• FA and EV range over subsets of 2(TxT)xW des­
ignating the sets of domain elements of type fact 
and event, respectively. 
• R is a :relation defined on T x W x W. R(t, w1, w2) 
means that world-histories w1 and w2 share a com­
mon past up to time t. The set of all world­
histories accessible from w at time t will be desig­
nated Rr. 
• P R is a probability assignment function that as­
signs to each time t and world-history w a proba­
bility function p.r. 
Figure 1: Structure imposed by the R accessibility 
relation. 
• F is the denotation function that maps every time 
symbol to an element of T, every fact symbol to 
an element of FA, and every event symbol to an 
element of EV. 
In section 2 the ontology of the logic was discussed 
from an intuitive standpoint. In order to obtain the 
desired intuitive properties, a number of constraints 
must be imposed on the models. These constraints 
Cl-6 are presented in the following discussion. 
The future branching temporal tree is defined in 
terms of the R relation over world-histories. R re­
lates worlds-histories with common pasts. To cap­
ture the future branching nature of time we say that 
if two world-histories share a common past up to 
time t2 then they share a common past up to any 
earlier time: 
(C1) H t1 < t2 and R(t2,w1,w2) then 
R(t1, w1,w2). 
Since R just represents the equality of histories up to 
a time t, for a fixed time R is an equivalence relation. 
( C2) For a fixed time R is reflexive, transitive, and 
symmetric. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the R relation ties together 
the different world-histories to form the temporal 
tree structure. 
Facts and events hold and occur in various world­
histories at various times. Thus, we identify facts 
and events with sets of (temporal interval, world} 
pairs. Following Shoham {1987), we take a temporal 
interval to be simply an ordered pair of time points. 
So a fact(event) is a set of elements of the form 
((t1, t2}, w}, where t1, t2 E T, t1 � t2, and w E W. 
H ((t1,t2},w} E A then fact(event) A holds(occurs) 
during interval (t1, t2} in world-history w. 
As mentioned earlier, facts and events differ in 
their temporal properties. This distinction is cap­
tured by the following semantic constraint which 
states that if a fact holds over an interval, it holds 
over all subintervals: 
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(C3) H t1 � t2 :5 ta � t4, t1 ¥= ta, t2 ¥= t4, 
fa E FA and ((tt,t.},w} E fa then ((t2,ta),w} E 
fa. 
To ensure consistency, the R accessibility relation 
must be compatible with the specifications in the 
model describing the facts that hold at different 
times and events that occur at different times in each 
world-history. Because R relates world-histories 
with common pasts, if two world-histories are R re­
lated at time t, they must agree on all facts( events) 
that hold( occur) over intervals ending before or at 
the same time as t: 
(C4) H t1 :5 t2 and R(t2, w1, w2) then 
((to, t1}, Wt} E A iff ((to, t1),w2} E A. 
In section 2, two desired characteristics of the proba­
bility operator were mentioned. The first is that the 
probability of a past fact or event should be either 
zero or one, depending on whether or not it actually 
happened. This is achieved by the following con­
straint. 
(C5) JJ�(.Rf) = 1. 
Defining the probabilities in this way makes good in­
tuitive sense if we look at the meaning of R. R� des­
ignates a set of world-histories that are objectively 
possible with respect to w at time t. It is natural 
that the set of world-histories that are objectively 
likely with respect to w at time t should be a subset 
of the ones that are possible. 
The second desired characteristic is that the prob­
ability at a time t be completely determined by the 
history up to that time. In other words, worlds that 
share a common past up to a given time t should 
share a common probability function at that time. 
This is again easily captured in terms of the R ac­
cessibility relation: 
(C6) H w1,w2 E Rf then JJ':1 = JJ':�. 
Given the models described above, the semantic def­
initions for the well-formed formulas are defined as 
follows. Note that the denotation of an expression 
<P relative to a model M and a world-history w is 
designated by [<P]M,v. 
1. [t1 ::=; t2]M,v =true iff F(tl) � F(t2). 
2. [t1 = t2]M,u = true iff F(tt) = F(t2). 
3. (HOLDS(tt,t2,fa)]M,v =true iff 
((F(tt),F(t2)},w} E F(la). 
4. [OCC(h, t2, ev)]M,v = true iff 
((F(t1),F(t2)},w} E F(ev). 
5. [Dt(<P)]M,u =true iff [<!J]M,v' =true 
for every w' such that R(F(t),w,w'). 
6. [Pt(<P) � o:]M,v =true iff 
l't'({w' E Rt I [<P]M,1A>' =true}) 2:: o:. 
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The interesting definitions are the last two. Defini­
tio� 5 says that a sentence is inevitable in a world 
w at a time t iff it is true in all worlds that share a 
common history with w up to time t. Definition 6 
says that the probability of a sentence ¢ is at least 
a in a world w at a time t iff the probability of those 
accessible worlds in which ¢ is true is at least a. 
A sentence ¢ is satisfied by a model M at a world 
w if it is assigned the value true in that model and 
world. A sentence is valid if it is satisfied by every 
model at every world. 
The following are some examples of valid sen­
tences. 
• The past is determined: 
(tt � t2) -t [P,2(HOLDS(to, t1, ¢)) = 0 V 
Pe2(HOLDS(to, t11 ¢)) = 1} 
(tt � t2) -t [Pt2(0CC(to,tt,¢)) = 0 V 
Pt2(0CC(to,ttt¢)) = 1} 
• If something is inevitable, it is certain: 
• Inevitability persists: 
• We also have the following rule of probabilistic 
detachment: 
5 Miller's Principle 
As a consequence of the characteristics we have im­
posed on probability, there is an interesting relation­
ship between probabilities assigned to the same sen­
tence at various times. The relationship is that the 
probability of a sentence at some time given that its 
probability at some future time is at least a should 
be at least a: P,1 ( ¢> I P,, ( ¢>) 2: a) 2: a. This relation 
is called Miller's principle and several nontemporal 
variants of it were first suggested by Brian Skyrms 
[1980] as possible constraints on higher-order proba­
bilities. We give here an informal intuitive argument 
that Miller's principle holds in this logic. The formal 
proof is omitted due to space limitations. 
If we agree that the history of events determines 
chance, as discussed in section 2, then temporally 
qualified probabilities can be written as conditional 
probabilities: l't(A) = p(Aihistory up to t). Then 
what should be the chance of A at time t1 given 
that events unfold to time t2, t1 � t2, such that the 
chance of A at t2 is a? At time t1, as far as events 
that determine the chance of A are concerned, all 
possible futures up to time t2 are equivalent. So the 
probability should just be  a: 
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l't,(A ll't2(A) =a)= 
l't1(A I JL(A I history up to t2) =a)= 
p,,(A I hist up to t2 is such that p(A) =a)= 
JL(A l history up to t1 & 
(history up to t2 is such that p(A) =a))= 
p(A I hist up to t2 is such that p(A) =a)= a 
In the object language, Miller's principle can be 
stated as the sentence schema: 
(t � t') -t P,(¢ A Pt•(¢) 2:: a) 2: a· Pt(Pt•(¢) 2: a) 
Every instance of this schema is valid in the temporal 
probability models. 
As a direct consequence of Miller's principle, the 
probability at a given time is the expected value 
of the probability at any future time. This will be 
called the ezpected value principle. Miller's princi­
ple and the expected value principle are useful be­
cause they allow the current probabilities of facts 
and events to be inferred from the probabilities of 
their future probabilities. For example, suppose that 
I am :first going to randomly choose between two 
coins, one fair coin and one with a 70% chance of 
heads, and then I am going to flip the chosen coin. 
There is a 50% chance that the coin will have a 70% 
chance of landing heads and a 50% chance that the 
coin will have a 50% chance of landing heads. By 
the expected value principle, it follows that there is 
now a 60% chance that the coin flip will result in 
heads. 
6 Causality 
It was stated in the introduction that one of the 
intended uses of this logic is for reasoning about ac­
tion effects. The primary relationship between an 
action and its effects is the causal relationship. Sup­
pes (1970} provides an elegant theory of probabilistic 
causality. He gives three "prima facie" conditions 
which are necessary for event A to cause event E. 
Note that his theory was developed in the context 
of instantaneous events. In the sentences below, At• 
denotes that event A occurs at time t' and Et de­
�otes that event E occurs at time t. 
1. Temporal precedence: t' � t 
2. Possibility of cause: P(At) > 0 
3. Positive influence: P(Et)A,,) > P(Et) 
These three conditions can be restated in the logic 
of time intervals. The three conditions stated for 
event A that occurs in the interval t.A to tA' and 
event E that occurs in the interval tE to tE' are 
1. Temporal non-succession: t.A -< tE• 
2. Possibility of cause: P,A(OCC(A,t.A,tA•)) > 0 
3. Positive influence: 
PtA(OCC(E, tE, tE•)IOCC(A, t.A,t.A•)) > 
PtA(OCC(E, tE, tE• )) 
Now it can be shown that because of the way objec­
tive probability has been defined, condition 3) en­
tails both conditions 1) and 2). Fhst, if condition 3) 
is expanded out into its proper form in the logic it 
becomes. 
P, .... ( OCC(E, tE, tE') A OCC(A, t.A, tA')) > 
P, .... (OCC(E, tE, tE•)) · P, .... (OCC(A, t.A, tA•)) 
It is clear that if P, .... (OCC(A,t.A,t.A•)) = 0 then the 
sentence is false. So if 3) holds, 2) must hold. Next, 
if 1) is false then iE• j tA. Since the probability of 
past events is either zero or one, either 
P, .... (OCC(E,tE,tE•)) = 0 
or 
P, .... (OCC(E,tE,tE•)) = 1. 
Either case contradicts 3). So if 3) holds, 1) must 
also hold. 
This result shows that the model of objective 
probability has captured the temporal :flow of causal­
ity as intended - actions cannot affect the past. As 
a consequence of this result, if we use condition 3) 
to define what it means for a plan to achieve a goal 
then we can prove that actions after the time of the 
goal cannot contribute to achieving the goal. 
The ability of the logic to represent and distin­
guish between truth and probability allows us to 
distinguish between potential causation and actual 
causation. Suppes [1970, pages 37-41] defines ac­
tual causation as potential causation that actually 
occurs: 
OCC(E, tE, tE') A 
P, .... (OCC(E, tE, tE' )IOCC(A, tA, tA•)) > 
P, .... (OCC(E, tE, tE•)) 
7 Examples 
In this section two examples illustrating the use of 
the logic are presented. The first example involves 
reasoning about the state of the world and the in­
fluence of the world state on the consequences of 
actions. Suppose I own a car that is not very reli­
able and often does not start if the weather is too 
cold. My car starts 30% of the time when the tem­
perature is below freezing. Suppose that there is an 
80% chance the temperature will be below freezing 
tomorrow morning. What is the chance that my car 
will start tomorrow morning? The first sentence can 
be represented as: 
P,0(0CC(t,t,.,start) I 
OCC(turn-key, t, t,•) A 
HOLDS(t, t,•, below-freezing)) = .3 
The second sentence can be represented as: 
Pt0(HOLDS(tM,tM•, below-freezing))= .8 
We also know that I will try to start my car sometime 
during tomorrow morning: 
(to --< tM j t, --< t,• :::; tM') 
152 
By the property of facts holding over subintervals 
and the rule of probabilistic detachment, 
P,0(HOLDS(t, t,., below-freezing)) � .8 
Assuming that the action of turning the key and the 
temperature are independent, we have 
Pt0(0CC(t, t,., start)/\ 
OCC(turn-key, t, t,• )) = (.3)(.8) = .24 
Finally, Because the probability that my car will 
start given that the temperature is not below freez­
ing is at most one, we have by the law of total prob­
ability 
Pt0(0CC(t, t,.,start)) � .24 + (1)(.2) = .44 
Thus we can conclude that, more likely than not, my 
car will not start and I should probably think about 
an alternative mode of transportation. 
The following example is a modified version of an 
example presented by Pelavin [1988). It illustrates 
how the logic can be used to reason about the feasi­
bility of plans. Suppose that I am going to :lly to San 
Francisco this evening. I have two small bags and 
would like to carry them both onto the plane with 
me. In most cases it is not possible to take two carry­
on bags if the plane is full. There is a 50% chance 
that the plane will be full this evening. What is the 
chance that carrying both bags on simultaneously 
will be a feasible course of action? The situation 
can be described by the following three sentences 
PnotD (-.Oh [OCC(carry-b1, t1, t2)/\ 
OCC(carry-b2, t1, t2)] I 
HOLDS{plane-full, h, t2)) = .8 
PnotD(HOLDS(plane-full, t11 t2)) = .5 
now --< t1 --< t2 
One possible model satisfying these sentences is 
shown in figure 2 .  The labels "OCCURS" and 
"-.OCCURS" designate the co-occurrence and non 
co-occurrence of the two actions, respectively. Note 
that in worlds w1 - W4 we have 
-.o,,[OCC(cauy-bl, t1, t2) 1\ OCC(carry-b2, t1, t2)] 
and in w5 and We we have 
Ot.(OCC(carry-bl, t1, t2) A OCC(carry-b2, t1, t2)] . 
From the first two sentences it follows that 
Pn., ( -.o,. [DCC( ca:rry-bl, t11 t2)/\ 
OCC(carry-b2, t1, t2)]) � .4 
So there is at least a 40% chance that carrying both 
bags simultaneously will not be feasible. 
Furthermore, an upper bound on the current prob­
ability of the co-occurence of the two actions can be 
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Figure 2: Possible model for carry example. 
calculated. By the relation between possibility and 
probability 
Pnoto (Pt1 (OCC(carry-b1, t1, t2)1\ 
OCC(carry-b2,t1,t2)) = 0) � .4 
and by the expected value property 
Pn0111 ( OCC(carry-bl, t1, t2)/\ 
OCC(carry-b2, t1, t2)) ::; .6 
8 Related Work 
The logic presented here is closely related to 
Pelavin's [1988] temporal planning logic. Pelavin 
develops a future-branching time logic for reason­
ing about planning problems involving concurrent 
actions and external events. He starts with Allen's 
[1984] linear temporal logic of time intervals and 
extends it with two modal operators, IN EV and 
IFTRIED, to reason about future branching time 
and action effects, respectively. I N  EV is exactly 
our 0 operator. IFTRIED is a counterfactual op­
erator that associates the attempt of an action with 
the truth of a sentence. The semantics of the opera­
tor are based on Stalnaker's and Lewis's theories of 
counterfactuals. IFTRIED captures the temporal 
relation of action and effect-an action cannot af­
fect the state of the world at any time preceding its 
attempt. Effects of general events cannot be repre­
sented in the logic. 
The present work departs from Pelavin 's frame­
work in two major ways. First, points are taken to be 
the primitive temporal objects rather than intervals. 
Pelavin[1988, p84] himself notes that this results in 
a more natural definition of the accessibility rela­
tion. Second, and more importantly, the language 
can represent uncertainty. Representing uncertainty 
with objective probability eliminates the need for 
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a separate counterfactual operator and its seman­
tic counterpart: the similarity measure over worlds . 
The standard deterministic counterfactual operator 
is replaced by conditional probability. Skyrms [1980] 
provides an elegant probabilistic account of counter­
factuals based on the notion of objective probability. 
The \emporal models we have presented are es­
sentially those of van Fraassen(1980]. He presents 
a semantic theory that models subjective probabil­
ity and objective chance, using a future-branching 
model of time points. In his models, objective prob­
ability can change with time but truth values can­
not. He shows that a property equivalent to Miller's 
principle holds between subjective probability and 
objective chance but not between objective chance 
at different times. He also does not provide a logical 
language. The probability logic we have presented 
is patterned after Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo's 
[1988]logic. They discuss axiomatizations and de­
cision procedures for various probability logics. The 
logics presented are not formulated in a temporal 
framework. 
9 Future Research 
This paper has presented a logic for reasoning about 
objective probability. It is important for a plan­
ning representation to be able to represent the state 
of knowledge of the planning agent. This can be 
done by introducing subjective probabilities into the 
logic. Several philosophers have discussed the prob­
lem of combining subjective probability and objec­
tive chance [Skyrms, 1980, Appendix 2][Lewis, 1980; 
van Fraassen, 1980]. The general consensus is that 
agents have subjective beliefs concerning objective 
chance and the two are related by certain con­
straints, although there is disagreement as to pre­
cisely what the constraints should be. It can be 
shown that such a hybrid representation of beliefs is 
necessary in order to make rational decisions in some 
cases where causality is a factor [Skyrms, 1980, ch 
IIC][Lewis, 1981; Maher, 1987). Extending the logic 
with subjective probability is relatively straightfor­
ward. Subjective probability can be modeled by 
defining probability functions over all worlds, not 
just the accessible ones. Corresponding to the two 
types of probability in the models, there would be 
two probability operators in the object language. 
Previous work [Halpern, 1989; Haddawy and 
Frisch, 1990] has shown that probability logic can 
be viewed as a generalization of modal logic. It has 
been shown [Gaifman, 1988; Haddawy and Frisch, 
1990] that the logics corresponding to staged prob­
ability models, similar to the temporal probability 
models presented here, are closely related to certain 
modal logics. It would be interesting to see whether 
the probability logic presented in this paper corre­
sponds exactly to some temporal modal logic. Such 
a modal logic would be useful in providing a quali-
tative representation of probabilistic ·information. 
The logic presented in this paper is propositional. 
Adding a theory of quantification would greatly en­
hance the expressive power of the language. 
In this paper no distinction has been made be­
tween the representation of actions and other events. 
But there are important distinctions. Actions have 
events associated with them but additionally actions 
are performed by an agent. An agent attempts an 
action and if the conditions are right, the action oc­
curs. For example, I attempt to lift an object and 
if the object is not too heavy, I succeed in lifting 
it. The author is currently elaborating the ontology 
presented in this paper to distinguish between action 
attempts and action occurrences. 
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